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Note 
 
Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: 
When Is a Lab Report Testimonial? 
Joe Bourne∗ 
Scientific evidence creates a unique opportunity for prose-
cutorial abuse.1 Investigations of police crime laboratories have 
revealed widespread error and sloppiness—even corruption.2 
Even well-intentioned, conscientious crime-laboratory workers 
may be subject to “subconscious . . . pro-prosecution bias” and 
“confirmation bias,” which can color their interpretations or re-
porting of results.3 The reports these forensic scientists gener-
ate play a powerful role in criminal prosecutions. According to 
the “CSI effect” theory, juror determinations increasingly rely 
on misunderstandings of the nature of scientific evidence 
spawned by forensic science television shows such as CSI: 
Crime Scene Investigation, which “portray[] forensic science as 
high-tech magic.”4 At the same time, the use of scientific evi-
dence at trials has increased significantly in recent years.5 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005, 
Emory University. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Cribari for assis-
tance in formulating a topic and for feedback and encouragement along the 
way. I also thank the board and staff of Volumes 92 and 93 of the Minnesota 
Law Review, in particular Nick Smith, Jenni Vainik, Mike Schoepf, Liz Borer, 
and Kyle Hawkins for their time, commentary, and support. 
 1. Cf. Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
475, 499 (2006) (describing the case of a West Virginia state trooper and foren-
sic serologist who “engage[d] in long-term, systematic, and deliberate falsifica-
tion of evidence in criminal cases”). 
 2. See generally id. at 491–500 (discussing sources of error). 
 3. Id. at 496–97. 
 4. N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction 
About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic 
Science, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 357, 358 (2007). For a detailed treatment of the 
CSI effect, see generally Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of 
Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 
(2006) (discussing the evidence for and against a “CSI effect” and exploring 
the potential implications of such an effect). Jurors, disappointed by evidence 
failing to live up to the standards developed from shows like CSI, could be 
more likely to find reasonable doubt. Id. at 1052. Or, they could be more likely 
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Meanwhile, constitutional law pertaining to the use of this 
science is in a state of turmoil. In 2004, the Supreme Court in 
Crawford v. Washington6 dramatically reworked its Confronta-
tion Clause7 analysis, holding that testimonial hearsay is in-
admissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness.8 The 
Court expressly did not define “testimonial” beyond setting a 
minimum baseline;9 it also failed to explicitly delineate a clear 
analytical framework.10 The Court again failed to set forth a 
comprehensive definition of “testimonial” in Davis v. Washing-
ton.11 Thus, while the confrontation right would offer a defen-
dant meaningful protection from an analyst’s scientific report if 
that report is testimonial, the Court did not clearly set forth the 
concept of testimoniality.12 
Because both Crawford and Davis were decided in the con-
text of statements made to police officers or agents of the police 
by persons who had directly witnessed the crimes at issue,13 
lower courts have had to fend for themselves in attempting to 
figure out what to do with scientific evidence such as laboratory 
reports and coroner’s reports. Under cases such as Ohio v. Ro-
 
to find the defendant guilty due to the combination of an overbelief in the 
probative value of science and the well-documented psychological desire to see 
wrongdoers punished. See id. at 1063–76. 
 5. See John M. Spires, Note, Testimonial or Nontestimonial? The Admis-
sibility of Forensic Evidence After Crawford v. Washington, 94 KY. L.J. 187, 
187 (2005). 
 6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 9. See id. (“[Testimonial] applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police in-
terrogations.”). 
 10. See id. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehen-
sive definition of ‘testimonial.’”). 
 11. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006) (noting that the 
Court was not “attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all con-
ceivable statements [that are] . . . testimonial”). 
 12. See id.; cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 192 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“There is no way to test the recollection and sift the conscience of 
a witness regarding the facts of an alleged offense if he is unwilling or unable 
to be questioned about them; defense counsel cannot probe the story of a silent 
witness and attempt to expose facts that qualify or discredit it.”). 
 13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38 (“At [the defendant’s] trial, the State played 
for the jury [his wife’s] tape-recorded statement to the police . . . .”); Davis, 547 
U.S. at 813 (“[A] 911 operator ascertained from [the victim] that she had been 
assaulted by her former boyfriend . . . [and] the court admitted the 911 record-
ing . . . .”). 
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berts,14 which considered factors such as the reliability of the 
evidence and articulated traditional constitutional balancing 
tests, such evidence typically withstood Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny.15 State courts and the lower federal courts are cur-
rently struggling to determine if, and explain why, they are 
dealing with testimonial or nontestimonial evidence.16 Courts 
are split on how to handle these cases, not due to distinguisha-
ble factual circumstances, but due to widely variant under-
standings of what the Supreme Court meant by “testimonial.”17 
Part I of this Note explicates the Supreme Court’s Confron-
tation Clause doctrine and the shift from Roberts to Crawford 
and Davis. Part II looks at the scientific-evidence question and 
examines how the lower courts have addressed it. This Part al-
so considers, and rejects, the developing case law holding that 
scientific evidence, if the product of a machine-based process, is 
not a statement of any person and therefore cannot constitute 
testimonial hearsay. Part III offers an analysis for courts to fol-
low. In order to be faithful to Crawford, courts should apply a 
bright-line rule that covers the most common types of cases: lab 
reports prepared by or for the police to further the investigation 
or prosecution of a suspected crime are per se testimonial. Un-
der the limited facts falling outside of such a rule—including 
cases involving autopsy reports, which present somewhat dif-
ferent constitutional considerations—courts should undertake 
fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries, considering the criteria 
laid out more fully in Part III. 
I.  SUPREME COURT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE   
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him . . . .”18 Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Confron-
tation Clause applies against the states.19 Yet what it guaran-
 
 14. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 15. Id. at 66 (“[A] statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia 
of reliability.’”). 
 16. See Cyrus P.W. Rieck, Note, How to Deal with Laboratory Reports un-
der Crawford v. Washington: A Question with No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 839, 907 (2008) (explaining that courts are “desperate for an answer”). 
 17. See id. (noting that courts are reaching different conclusions on “es-
sentially the same facts”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 19. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
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tees in practice has been the subject of considerable debate, in 
part, no doubt, because as the second Justice Harlan once 
noted, the text on its face leaves itself open to widely variant 
interpretations.20 Judicial understanding of the Confrontation 
Clause has changed significantly through the years. This Note 
first considers the long-dominant Roberts paradigm, followed 
by the sudden shift to Crawford analysis and the Davis Court’s 
addition to Crawford’s guidance. 
A. ROBERTS RELIABILITY AND BALANCING 
Following precedent, in 1980 the Roberts Court held that a 
defendant’s confrontation right was not violated by the prose-
cution’s use of hearsay statements made by an unavailable 
witness at a preliminary hearing at which the defendant func-
tionally cross-examined the witness.21 Apart from this narrow 
holding, the Court’s opinion was important for its reasoning, 
which came to stand for two doctrinal propositions. 
First, Roberts stood for the proposition that the Confronta-
tion Clause was subject to a balancing test. Acknowledging in 
dicta that the Clause “reflects a preference for face-to-face con-
frontation at trial,”22 the Court explained that “competing in-
terests, if ‘closely examined,’ may warrant dispensing with con-
frontation at trial.”23 While the language of close examination 
suggests a difficult threshold for the government to pass, the 
Court noted that the government always has “strong” compet-
ing interests in two overarching areas: “effective law enforce-
ment” and “development and precise formulation of the rules of 
evidence applicable in criminal proceedings.”24 This could be 
read as a signal to lower courts that the defendant’s confronta-
tion right is, on balance, really not all that weighty. 
Second, the Court concluded that, for Confrontation Clause 
purposes, admissibility of the hearsay testimony of an unavail-
able declarant depended on the reliability of that hearsay.25 As 
 
 20. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“[T]he clause may be read to confer nothing more than a 
right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial. . . . 
[But] the clause is equally susceptible of being interpreted as a blanket prohi-
bition on the use of any hearsay testimony.”). 
 21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70–73 (1980). 
 22. Id. at 63. 
 23. Id. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 66 (noting that hearsay of an unavailable witness may be 
admitted “if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability’”). 
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a per se matter, hearsay was deemed to exhibit sufficient “indi-
cia of reliability” if it matched a “firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion.”26 Otherwise the prosecution would have to show that the 
hearsay bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to 
get it admitted at trial against the defendant without allowing 
the defendant a right to confront the declarant.27 In other 
words, the Roberts Court construed the Clause to procedurally 
protect criminal defendants from substantively unreliable ac-
cusatory evidence.28 
B. REJECTING ROBERTS-TYPE ANALYSIS: CRAWFORD’S 
“TESTIMONIAL” FRAMEWORK 
In 2004 the Supreme Court overruled the Roberts test in 
Crawford v. Washington, finding reliability analysis “so unpre-
dictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even 
core confrontation violations.”29 The Court also rejected the use 
of a balancing test where a defendant’s confrontation right was 
violated.30 Crawford instead issued a bright-line command: tes-
timonial hearsay is only admissible if the witness is unavaila-
ble and the accused had “a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”31 Since it was not necessary on the facts of the 
case to do so, the Court opted not to “spell out a comprehensive 
definition of ‘testimonial.’”32 Consequently, the considerations 
that were important to the Crawford Court’s discussion of tes-
timonial hearsay must be looked to for any future Confronta-
tion Clause analysis. 
The Court traced the common law origin of the confronta-
tion right back to the famous 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh, in which Raleigh was sentenced to death based on the 
out-of-court, co-conspiratorial confession of Lord Cobham.33 Ra-
leigh argued that Cobham was lying, and demanded that Cob-
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. But cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (explaining 
that the framers created a “procedural rather than substantive” constitutional 
protection in order “to ensure reliability of evidence,” and criticizing the Ro-
berts test for allowing juries to hear evidence untested by adversarial cross-
examination where a judge found the evidence to be substantively reliable). 
 29. Id. at 63. 
 30. See id. at 67–68 (“By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees 
with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”). 
 31. Id. at 68. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 43–44. 
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ham tell his story to Raleigh and the jury; the English court re-
fused to recognize such a confrontation right.34 The First Con-
gress had in mind this type of abuse when it included the Con-
frontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.35 Crawford 
establishes that the “principal evil” at which the Clause is 
aimed is the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence against 
the accused.”36 
The Court expressly rejected the theory that the constitu-
tional right to cross-examination might be coterminous with 
hearsay rules: 
An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus 
a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little 
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause tar-
geted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes be 
admissible under modern hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly 
would not have condoned them.37 
Thus, Confrontation Clause analysis should not look to 
hearsay law.38 In dicta, however, the Court suggested that two 
hearsay exceptions are particularly noteworthy.39 First, be-
cause the “dying declarations” hearsay exception existed at 
common law, it may have been incorporated into the Sixth 
Amendment, even where testimonial dying declarations are at 
issue.40 Second, the “business records” exception was part of the 
common law by 1791 when the Sixth Amendment was passed, 
but significantly, these records “by their nature were not testi-
monial.”41 The Court’s consideration of which exceptions were 
allowed in criminal cases by 1791, and its general emphasis on 
the historical backdrop to the Confrontation Clause, indicates 
that courts should look to history.42 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 49 (noting how the First Congress responded to an Antifede-
ralist writing that “criticized the use of ‘written evidence’” without the “cross 
examining [of ] witnesses”). 
 36. Id. at 50. 
 37. Id. at 51. 
 38. See id. at 61 (“Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not 
think the framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the va-
garies of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliabili-
ty.’”). 
 39. Id. at 56 & n.6. 
 40. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court noted that “[i]f this exception must be ac-
cepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” Id. 
 41. Id. at 56. 
 42. See id. at 43–50. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the seven-Justice majority 
was a decidedly originalist opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for him-
self and Justice O’Connor, while concurring in the overall judgment, dissented 
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Although the Court did not spell out a complete definition 
of “testimonial,” it set a minimum baseline that includes “prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and . . . police interrogations.”43 Additionally, the 
Court explained that statements made to police officers during 
the course of interrogations are testimonial “under even a nar-
row standard” because they “bear a striking resemblance to ex-
aminations by justices of the peace in England,” making clear 
that a statement is testimonial if it is the contemporary analo-
gue of an abuse about which the First Congress was con-
cerned.44 The last piece of definitional guidance the Court of-
fered was three potential articulations of testimonial hearsay: 
(1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent”; (2) 
“formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions”; and (3) “statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.”45 Because it was not neces-
sary for the Court to adopt any of these various formulations, it 
did not expressly do so—but notably, it also did not reject any 
of them.46 Lending support to the third, broadest formulation, 
the Court noted that “[i]nvolvement of government officers in 
the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents 
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time 
and again throughout a history with which the Framers were 
keenly familiar.”47 
In sum, the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of 
testimonial hearsay in lieu of in-court confrontation either if 
the declarant is available or if the defendant lacked a prior op-
portunity for cross-examination of an unavailable declarant.48 
In deciding whether a statement is testimonial, a court should 
not look to modern hearsay rules, but rather to the historical 
context of the Sixth Amendment while considering what would 
be the contemporary analogues to the Framers’ concerns.49 And 
 
on prudential and stare decisis grounds from the Court’s decision to overrule 
Roberts. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 43. Id. at 68 (majority opinion). 
 44. See id. at 52. 
 45. Id. at 51–52. 
 46. See id. at 52 (“These formulations all share a common nucleus and 
then define the clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”). 
 47. Id. at 56 n.7. 
 48. Id. at 68. 
 49. Id. at 67–68 (discussing how it is unlikely that the framers would be 
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anything which looks too much like prosecutorially elicited ex 
parte testimony will raise Confrontation Clause concerns.50 
C. THE DAVIS TIMING PRONG: ONGOING EMERGENCIES VS. 
INVESTIGATION OF PAST CRIMES 
Two years later, the Court in Davis again opted not to “at-
tempt[] to produce an exhaustive classification” of testimoniali-
ty.51 It did, however, articulate an investigatory purpose test: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police in-
terrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the pri-
mary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circums-
tances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.52 
The Court was careful to note that the totality of the cir-
cumstances test it articulated was no broader than necessary to 
resolve the cases before it.53 Statements not made in response 
to police interrogation may also be testimonial.54 The Court al-
so noted that “even when interrogation exists,” ultimately “the 
declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions,” are 
controlling for Confrontation Clause analysis.55 
In determining whether statements made during a 911 call 
and a house call by the police in response to domestic violence 
were testimonial hearsay, the Court considered the following 
 
satisfied relying on modern “reliability factors”). 
 50. Cf. id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause 
was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its 
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”). 
 51. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 52. Id. at 822. The Court was apparently unconcerned with the subjective 
intention of the police officer doing the investigating or interrogating. Justice 
Thomas, in a separate opinion, articulated the reason behind the objective na-
ture of the Court’s test as follows:  
The Court’s repeated invocation of the word “objectiv[e]” to describe 
its test . . . suggests that the Court may not mean to reference pur-
pose at all, but instead to inquire into the function served by the in-
terrogation. Certainly such a test would avoid the pitfalls that have 
led us repeatedly to reject tests dependent on the subjective inten-
tions of police officers. 
Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement and dissenting in part). 
 53. See id. at 822 n.1 (majority opinion) (explaining that the holding ap-
plies specifically to interrogations because the statements of the current case 
were the “products of interrogations”). 
 54. Id. (“This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the ab-
sence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.”). 
 55. Id. 
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factors: contemporaneousness; the existence of an “ongoing 
emergency”; “the nature of what was asked and answered”; and 
formality or solemnity.56 In the case of a 911 call where the dec-
larant identified her assailant while she faced an ongoing 
emergency, the operator’s questions were objectively designed 
to “elicit[] statements . . . necessary to be able to resolve the 
present emergency,” and her answers were “frantic” and “pro-
vided over the phone” in a potentially dangerous situation, the 
Court held that her statements were nontestimonial.57 Essen-
tially, because “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an 
emergency and seek help,” her “emergency statement” was in-
sufficiently similar to the type of ex parte testimony on which 
Raleigh was convicted to create a Sixth Amendment problem.58 
On different facts the Court reached the opposite conclu-
sion.59 Where the police arrived at the declarant’s home, were 
told by her “that things were fine,” she was not presently in 
danger, and the officers questioned her in a separate room from 
her husband for the purpose of obtaining better information 
about the crime that had occurred, the Court determined that 
the declarant’s statements were “an obvious substitute for live 
testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on di-
rect examination,” thus rendering the statements testimonial.60 
Such an inquiry is plainly fact-intensive. Further complicating 
a Davis inquiry is the Court’s encouragement of the use of in 
limine procedure to redact the testimonial portions of state-
ments that began as nontestimonial statements made in re-
sponse to an emergency.61 
Davis does not contemplate scientific evidence. However, 
the analytical factors employed by the Court can be useful to 
lower courts attempting to determine whether such evidence is 
testimonial. 
 
 56. Id. at 827. 
 57. Id. at 814, 827. 
 58. Id. at 828. 
 59. Two different state supreme court cases were consolidated in Davis v. 
Washington and thus the Court was able to apply its interpretation of the Con-
frontation Clause to two entirely different sets of facts. Id. at 817–21. 
 60. Id. at 830. 
 61. Id. at 829. 
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II.  SCIENCE MEETS THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN 
THE LOWER COURTS   
Cases involving scientific evidence commonly occur where 
seized substances are tested for a composition analysis, where 
blood samples of suspected intoxicated drivers are tested for al-
cohol and narcotics content, where DNA analysis is performed 
in rape or homicide cases, and where medical examiners per-
form autopsies.62 In such cases, Roberts reliability analysis was 
fairly easy to perform. But courts have struggled to apply the 
new testimoniality analysis prescribed by Crawford and Davis. 
This Part examines the cases that consider evidence such as 
laboratory reports to be per se testimonial, the cases that es-
sentially render ad hoc decisions, the post-Crawford cases that 
are de facto Roberts analyses, and the machine-generated-
statements rationale currently being developed in at least three 
of the circuits. 
A. COURTS HOLDING THAT A LABORATORY REPORT IS ALWAYS 
TESTIMONIAL 
This Note now considers the various cases finding labora-
tory reports to be per se testimonial within the meaning of 
Crawford and Davis. Typical of these cases is State v. Caul-
field,63 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a po-
lice laboratory report identifying a seized substance as cocaine 
constituted testimonial hearsay where the analyst who pre-
pared the report did not testify at trial.64 The court found that 
the laboratory report fit under “each of the three generic de-
scriptions offered by the Supreme Court in Crawford” of what 
“testimonial” might mean.65 First, it “functioned as the equiva-
lent of testimony” by identifying the cocaine as cocaine.66 
Second, the report was an affidavit—a formalized testimonial 
material specifically identified in Crawford.67 Third, it “was 
clearly prepared for litigation.”68 The court considered the 
last—preparation for use at trial—to be the “critical determina-
 
 62. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ark. 1991); State v. 
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Minn. 2006); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 
628–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 63. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 304. 
 64. Id. at 306–07. 
 65. Id. at 309. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; Crawford v. Washinton, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 68. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309. 
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tive factor” in its analysis.69 Anticipating Davis, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court relied heavily on the circumstances surround-
ing the generation of the “statement” identifying the seized 
substance, concluding that the sole purpose of generating the 
laboratory report was to have it available for use at trial.70 The 
court’s determination was based on the facts that the police had 
already arrested Caulfield and that they had preliminarily de-
termined that the seized substance was cocaine.71 
A New Jersey appellate court in State v. Kent72 reached a 
similar conclusion to Caulfield applying both Crawford and 
Davis.73 Adam J. Kent had crashed his car, and when a police 
officer arrived at the scene at 1:40 a.m., he noted that Kent 
smelled of alcohol.74 Kent acknowledged that he had been 
drinking.75 The suspect was taken to a hospital, where the of-
ficer asked a nurse to draw a sample of his blood, which was 
then taken to a police laboratory for toxicology and gas chroma-
tography analysis.76 The laboratory report indicated that the 
defendant’s blood alcohol content was above the legal limit.77 
While acknowledging that, under the New Jersey Rules of Evi-
dence, a police chemist’s laboratory report is a business record, 
the Kent court nonetheless found that admission of the chem-
ist’s report where the chemist did not testify at trial violated 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine him.78 
Performing a Davis analysis, the court concluded that the de-
fendant’s blood was not analyzed to deal with an ongoing emer-
gency, and that the primary purpose of the report was to prove 
at trial the past event that the defendant’s blood alcohol con-
centration was high enough to expose him to criminal liabili-
ty.79 The court also concluded that under Crawford the nurse’s 
signed blood sample certification was the functional equivalent 
 
 69. See id. (“We have said the critical determinative factor assessing 
whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation.”). 
 70. See id. (“The . . . report was clearly prepared for litigation.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 73. Cf. id. at 639–40 (citing Caulfield with approval). 
 74. Id. at 628–29. 
 75. Id. at 629. 
 76. Id. at 629–31. 
 77. Id. at 631. 
 78. Id. at 636–40. 
 79. Id. at 637. 
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of an affidavit because the nurse knew that falsifying its con-
text would be unlawful, thereby rendering it testimonial.80 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same con-
clusion as the Minnesota and New Jersey courts did in Caul-
field and Kent. The distilled analysis of these decisions consists 
of two major, interrelated points. First, laboratory reports do 
not fall within the business-records exception recognized in 
1791, that is, the inherently nontestimonial sort of business 
record contemplated by Justice Scalia’s dictum in Crawford.81 
As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained: “Tradi-
tionally, the historical business-records exception did not en-
compass records prepared for use in litigation, let alone records 
produced ex parte by government agents for later use in crimi-
nal prosecution.”82 The court explained that Crawford makes 
clear that the accused’s confrontation right cannot have been 
diminished by expansions of the business-records exception un-
der modern evidence law.83 
Second, courts emphasize that these reports are being gen-
erated for the primary (or sole) purpose of facilitating criminal 
prosecution, and that as such they are testimonial statements 
implicating the Confrontation Clause.84 The United States Ar-
my Court of Criminal Appeals provides a good example of this 
reasoning in United States v. Williamson.85 The defendant’s 
marijuana was seized, tested, and subsequently identified by a 
senior forensic chemist as marijuana.86 The court concluded 
that because “the ‘statement’ [was] a post-apprehension labora-
tory report, requested after local police arrested [the defen-
dant],” the statement—that scientific examination indicated 
that the seized substance was an illegal drug—was necessarily 
testimonial.87 Courts have also reached this conclusion in the 
 
 80. See id. at 637–39. 
 81. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also Thomas 
v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 13 (D.C. 2006) (“As an historical matter, the ex-
ception in 1791 was a very narrow one.”). 
 82. Thomas, 914 A.2d at 13. 
 83. Id. at 27. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“[B]ecause DEA chemist’s reports are created ex-
pressly for use in criminal prosecutions as a substitute for live testimony 
against the accused, such reports are testimonial, whether or not they happen 
to meet this jurisdiction’s definition of a business record.”). 
 85. United States v. Williamson, 65 M.J. 706 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007). 
 86. Id. at 707–10. 
 87. Id. at 717–18. 
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context of laboratory reports identifying seized substances,88 
tests of a rape victim’s blood alcohol content where her intoxi-
cation level affected her ability to consent,89 and tests of the 
suspect’s blood in drunk driving cases such as Kent.90 
B. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS NONTESTIMONIAL—BUT ONLY 
SOMETIMES 
While many courts have conducted fairly fact-intensive in-
quiries, a rare occurrence in which the outcome truly seems de-
pendent on the unique facts of the case is United States v. Ma-
gyari.91 In Magyari, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces held that a laboratory report identifying a posi-
tive test for methamphetamine during the course of regular, 
randomized urinalysis screening was nontestimonial.92 The 
court admitted the technician’s report under a business-records 
hearsay exception.93 It emphasized that the urinalysis was 
“routine” and randomized, and that the “vast majority” of such 
tests are negative for illegal substances.94 In the Magyari 
court’s view, the technicians simply “were not engaged in a law 
enforcement function, a search for evidence in anticipation of 
prosecution or trial. . . . Because the lab technicians were mere-
ly cataloging the results of routine tests, the technicians could 
not reasonably expect their data entries would ‘bear testimony’ 
against Appellant at his court-martial.”95 
 
 88. See, e.g., Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo. 2007) 
(en banc) (“There can be no serious dispute that the sole purpose of the report 
was to analyze the substance found in Hinojos-Mendoza’s vehicle in anticipa-
tion of criminal prosecution.”); State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 376 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2007) (“The forensic scientist who prepared Laturner’s lab report was a 
witness; the statements in her lab report were testimony; and she knew when 
preparing her report that it would be used by the State at Laturner’s trial to 
prove he committed the crime of possessing methamphetamine.”); State v. 
March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (“A laboratory report, like this one, 
that was prepared solely for prosecution to prove an element of the crime 
charged is ‘testimonial’ because it bears all the characteristics of an ex parte 
affidavit.”). 
 89. See People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) 
(“Because the test was initiated by the prosecution and generated by the de-
sire to discover evidence against defendant, the results were testimonial.”). 
 90. See State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 637–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007).  
 91. United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 92. Id. at 124–25. 
 93. Id. at 127; see MIL. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 94. Magyari, 63 M.J. at 126. 
 95. Id. at 126–27. 
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In concluding that the technicians could not have reasona-
bly expected the results of their tests to be used for prosecution, 
the court also stressed the importance of the following facts: 
many people tested Magyari’s urine sample and recorded data 
entries in his records; his sample was distinguishable only by 
an anonymous number; and there was no reason to think that 
anyone was pressured to reach a particular conclusion.96 How-
ever, the court expressly rejected the theory that laboratory re-
ports are never testimonial.97 It was quick to point out that la-
boratory reports or similar records might be prepared “at the 
behest of law enforcement in anticipation of prosecution,” 
which would likely compel a finding of testimoniality.98 It con-
cluded merely that the relevant Crawford considerations were 
not in play under the unique facts with which it was pre-
sented.99 Importantly, the situation lacked both the potential 
and the incentive for prosecutorial abuse. 
C. NONTESTIMONIALITY AND THE TENDENCY TOWARD ROBERTS 
ANALYSIS DRESSED IN CRAWFORD AND DAVIS CLOTHING 
This Note now examines the line of cases holding that la-
boratory reports, and similar examples of scientific evidence, 
are not testimonial. Five considerations run thematically 
throughout these cases: the contemporaneous recordation of a 
presently observable event; the fit of a business-records or simi-
lar hearsay exception; the objective facticity of the evidence; the 
value of cross-examination for the defendant; and society’s 
competing interests. Notably, such considerations are all de-
rived from a misreading of Davis, a misunderstanding of Craw-
ford, or a latent Roberts analysis. 
1. Contemporaneous Recordation of Observations 
An example of misplaced reliance on contemporaneousness 
is the California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Geier.100 
Geier involved a DNA report in a rape-homicide case.101 The 
 
 96. Id. at 127. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Cf. id. (“This conclusion is consistent with the Crawford Court’s policy 
concerns that might arise where government officers are involved ‘in the pro-
duction of testimony with an eye toward trial’ and where there is ‘unique po-
tential for prosecutorial abuse’ and overreaching.” (quoting Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004))). 
 100. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007). 
 101. Id. at 110, 131. 
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court concluded that, based on Crawford and Davis, a DNA re-
port would be testimonial only if it “describes a past fact re-
lated to criminal activity.”102 That is, under the court’s inter-
pretation of Davis, “the crucial point is whether the statement 
represents the contemporaneous recordation of observable 
events.”103 That the DNA report was requested by the police 
and the testing scientist could have anticipated its later use at 
a criminal trial was more or less irrelevant, since the court 
rendered these factors insufficient to implicate the Confronta-
tion Clause.104 
The Geier court’s application of its rule to the facts before it 
was straightforward: the state’s DNA analyst recorded her ob-
servations at the time they occurred.105 The things she wrote in 
her report therefore “constitute a contemporaneous recordation 
of observable events rather than the documentation of past 
events.”106 The court accordingly held that the DNA report was 
nontestimonial.107 
Other jurisdictions have undertaken similar inquiries. The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State v. O’Maley108 
agreed with Geier ’s focus on “contemporaneous recordation,” 
proclaiming it a “crucial point.”109 At issue in O’Maley was a la-
boratory report of a drunk driving suspect’s blood alcohol con-
tent where the workers who actually collected and tested 
O’Maley’s blood did not testify at trial.110 The court held that 
the blood sample collection form filled out by the blood-drawing 
technician “constituted the technician’s contemporaneous re-
cordation of observable events” and did not “describe any of the 
defendant’s past conduct.”111 Rather than continuing this line 
of thought, the court disposed of the question of the analyst’s 
report on the theory that the report was never offered into evi-
dence.112 
This strain of analysis is fatally flawed. The argument that 
a laboratory report used to prove a DNA match to prosecute a 
 
 102. Id. at 138. 
 103. Id. at 140. 
 104. See id. at 139. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 140. 
 108. State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2007). 
 109. Id. at 11 (quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140).  
 110. Id. at 4. 
 111. Id. at 13. 
 112. See id. at 13–14. 
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rape-homicide is not used to prove past events and is merely a 
present-sense recording is conceptually specious.113 But apart 
from the argument’s conceptual incoherence, it is constitution-
ally incorrect—it is based on a substantial misreading of Davis. 
Davis was a fact-intensive inquiry made in the context of a po-
lice response to domestic violence.114 The Court focused on con-
temporaneousness to determine whether the circumstances 
surrounding the statements made to the police objectively indi-
cated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to re-
spond to an ongoing emergency or whether it was to gather 
evidence pertaining to the past event (domestic violence) to be 
proved at a subsequent criminal trial.115 In considering the con-
temporaneousness of the Davis declarant’s statements to the 
911 operator, the court in Geier ignored the existence of the on-
going emergency in Davis which the declarant was contempo-
raneously describing to the police.116 Geier ’s DNA analyst was 
certainly not analyzing DNA, and at the same time recording 
that analysis, in response to any ongoing emergency; and re-
moved from the requirement of an ongoing emergency, all re-
cording of testimonial hearsay statements would qualify as con-
temporaneous recording. 
2. Crawford’s Business-Records Exception 
The vast majority of cases finding scientific evidence non-
testimonial misread the language in Crawford suggesting that 
business records are inherently nontestimonial. The Second 
Circuit, for example, held in United States v. Feliz117 that a 
business record within the meaning of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the Supreme 
Court’s idea of testimonial hearsay.118 The Second Circuit’s ra-
tionale was that since business records by definition are not 
made in anticipation of litigation and do not include observa-
tions of police officers, they necessarily do not raise the sorts of 
concerns the First Congress had in mind when it authored the 
 
 113. Cf. State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) 
(“Nor can it reasonably be argued that the ‘primary purpose’ of the lab certifi-
cate was anything other than to prove past events, specifically defendant’s 
blood alcohol concentration, relevant to his DWI prosecution.”). 
 114. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 115. See id. at 827. 
 116. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 138 (Cal. 2007). 
 117. United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 118. Id. at 233–34; see FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
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Sixth Amendment.119 In Feliz, the court dealt with the admis-
sibility of autopsy reports of nine murder victims.120 It ac-
knowledged that a reasonable medical examiner should antic-
ipate that an autopsy report might be used at trial, but stated, 
“this practical expectation alone cannot be dispositive on the 
issue of whether those reports are testimonial.”121 It then held 
on other grounds that autopsy reports are nontestimonial busi-
ness records.122 
Citing its own pre-Crawford precedent, the Massachusetts 
high court in Commonwealth v. Verde123 asserted that a chem-
ist’s report identifying a seized substance as cocaine was ad-
missible as prima facie evidence without the chemist’s testimo-
ny under the public-records hearsay exception.124 The court 
noted that the public-records exception was a “well-recognized” 
one.125 The court’s analysis ultimately came down to its view 
that the laboratory report was nontestimonial because it ex-
pressed objective scientific facts rather than conclusory opi-
nions.126 An Illinois appellate court voiced a similar theory, ex-
plaining, “Crawford specifically disclaims any intention to 
restrict traditional hearsay exceptions.”127 
To the extent that courts rely on the theory that Crawford 
permits the introduction of hearsay insofar as it falls within a 
traditional hearsay exception, they seem to have confused cur-
rent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence—Crawford—with the 
old rule—Roberts—which is no longer good law.128 In other 
 
 119. Feliz, 467 F.3d at 234; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
42–50 (2004) (discussing the original intent behind the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause). 
 120. Feliz, 467 F.3d at 229. 
 121. Id. at 235. 
 122. See id. at 236–37. Those “other grounds” are competing interests 
which effectively constitute a Roberts balancing test. See Roberts v. Ohio, 448 
U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).  
 123. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005). Verde was the 
precursor to Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, the latest Confrontation Clause 
case taken up by the Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 
870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished table decision), cert. 
granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591). 
 124. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704–05. 
 125. Id. at 705 n.3. 
 126. See id. at 705–06. 
 127. People v. So Young Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 128. In 2007, Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that 
“Roberts had held that the Confrontation Clause permitted the admission of a 
hearsay statement made by a declarant who was unavailable to testify if the 
statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability . . . because the statement fell 
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words, such opinions apply Roberts under the nominal guise of 
applying Crawford. 
The Second Circuit argued that the limitations on the 
business-records exception function to weed out testimonial 
evidence.129 Certainly if a record is not testimonial in nature, 
the Confrontation Clause does not restrict its admission—the 
Clause only applies to testimonial statements.130 But as the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court explained, “[t]he Crawford dic-
ta related to the business record exception that existed when 
the Federal Constitution was drafted, not that which currently 
exists.”131 The Second Circuit, after acknowledging a factor that 
might render an autopsy report testimonial in spite of the 
court’s interpretation of the hearsay exception—reasonable an-
ticipation of prosecutorial use—then failed to explain why the 
evidence was nonetheless nontestimonial.132 
3. The Objective Facticity of Science 
Some courts have concluded that objective facts in a scien-
tific report are nontestimonial. The Supreme Court of Kansas, 
for example, drew a distinction in State v. Lackey133 between 
objective factual observations and opinions or disputed conclu-
sions. The “factual, routine, descriptive, and nonanalytical find-
ings” contained in an autopsy report are, according to the court, 
not testimonial, whereas “conclusions drawn from the objective 
findings” are testimonial.134 Lackey rejected a distinction be-
tween autopsy reports prepared for homicide investigations and 
those where criminal litigation was not expected,135 instead 
premising its rule on the theory that “routine and descriptive 
observations” where the “examiner would have little incentive 
 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception . . . .” Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 
1173, 1178 (2007). This approach is now defunct: “[t]he Crawford rule is flatly 
inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford 
overruled.” Id. at 1181. 
 129. See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 130. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). 
 131. State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 11 (N.H. 2007). 
 132. See Feliz, 467 F.3d at 234–36. 
 133. State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332 (Kan. 2005), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317, 321–23 (Kan. 2006). Davis overruled Lackey 
with respect to hearsay evidence other than the autopsy report. See Davis, 158 
P.3d at 321–23. 
 134. Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351. 
 135. Id. at 349. 
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to fabricate the results” do not implicate the concerns expressed 
in Crawford.136 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also drew a 
line around records of “primary fact.”137 It explained: 
“[c]ertificates of chemical analysis are neither discretionary nor 
based on opinion; rather, they merely state the results of a 
well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and 
quantity of the substance.”138 Based on similar theories, other 
courts have concluded that to the extent that reports contain 
“objective” data, they cannot be testimonial because they are 
not accusatory.139 
Such arguments are circular and depend on reliability con-
siderations.140 Because “routine factual findings in an autopsy 
report are generally reliable,” courts reason, “therefore, evi-
dence of routine factual findings is not testimonial.”141 A Kan-
sas appellate court explained the potential consequences of 
adopting a “scientific facts are nontestimonial” rule on the facts 
of the narcotics possession case before it: 
A sine qua non for guilt is the possession of methamphetamine, proof 
of which is only found in a report, the accuracy of which has not been 
tested in the courtroom. To overcome the presumption of innocence 
and convict Laturner of this charge, the jury had to be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the lab report was correct. Thus, 
 
 136. See id. at 351. 
 137. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465, 469 (Mass. 1923)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007) (“Records of 
laboratory protocols followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not ac-
cusatory.”); State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 2007) (“The second factor 
we believe is important is whether the statement is an accusation.”); see also 
Michael H. Graham, Crawford/Davis “Testimonial” Interpreted, Removing the 
Clutter, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 836–37 (2008) (arguing that forensic labora-
tory reports are nontestimonial because they “do not themselves accuse an 
identified or identifiable person of having committed a crime”). 
 140. See, e.g., Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 666 (Colo. 2007) 
(en banc) (accusing courts of “erroneously focus[ing] on the reliability of [la-
boratory] reports”); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006) (en 
banc) (“The state refers us to cases from other states that, after Crawford, 
hold that lab reports are not testimonial. But these cases seem to wrongly fo-
cus on the reliability of such reports.”); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 
(Mo. 2007) (“[G]enerally these cases seem to incorrectly focus on the reliability 
of such reports.”); cf. Metzger, supra note 1, at 510 (“The misapprehension 
about the testimonial nature of the crime laboratory reports seems to be this: 
because the affidavits are ‘provided according to scientific procedures and 
analysis,’ they are not testimonial.”). 
 141. State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 375 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (criticizing 
this “circular” reasoning). 
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proof of guilt becomes ipse dixit: it is so because the State says it is 
so.142 
Admission of otherwise testimonial statements merely be-
cause they consist of “neutral” facts—raw data rather than in-
terpreted data—flies in the face of the Court’s reasoning in 
Crawford.143 The “accusatory” angle, imagining that facts con-
tained in a laboratory or autopsy report do not accuse the de-
fendant of anything, also fails to withstand scrutiny—if a fact 
is nonaccusatory, then in a typical DUI case, a defendant could 
be convicted on the sole basis of two nonaccusatory, ex parte af-
fidavits: (1) a police officer’s statement that she saw the defen-
dant driving a car, then had the defendant’s blood drawn; and 
(2) a laboratory technician’s statement that the defendant’s 
blood contained a certain amount of an intoxicating substance. 
Yet that would commit the “principal evil” that Crawford at-
tempts to eradicate.144 
4. Evidentiary Value to the Accused 
In finding scientific evidence nontestimonial, courts tend to 
point out that cross-examination would probably have been of 
little value to the defendant in any event. In admitting a DNA 
analysis report, the Supreme Court of California explained that 
the analyst’s supervisor’s testimony “could reconstruct what the 
analyst who processed the samples did at every step” because 
laboratory regulations required the analyst to follow a set pro-
tocol.145 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted that if 
the technician had testified at trial, she merely would have said 
that her report was accurate.146 And in any event, “she ‘would 
almost certainly not remember’” at trial how that exact test 
had been performed.147 The Second Circuit posited that the fact 
that “‘medical examiners who regularly perform hundreds of 
autopsies are unlikely to have any independent recollection of 
the autopsy at issue’”148 constitutes a “practical difficult[y]” 
 
 142. Id. at 376. 
 143. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004) (“The Framers 
would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against 
a criminal defendant because it was elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers.”). 
 144. See id. at 50. 
 145. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 132 (Cal. 2007). The court also noted 
that “DNA extraction is not a difficult procedure.” Id.  
 146. See State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 2007). 
 147. Id. at 14 (quoting State v. Coombs, 821 A.2d 1030, 1033 (N.H. 2003)). 
 148. United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)). 
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avoided by its conclusion.149 But what is the practical difficulty? 
Putting the analyst on the stand to say “I don’t remember this 
particular examination, but I always follow protocol and I stand 
behind what I put in my report” allows the jury to make an in-
formed decision, and provides the defendant a fair opportunity 
to inquire about bias and sloppy work habits. 
Notably, the Second Circuit’s admonition about the likely 
low value of cross-examination came in the context of its dis-
cussion of the dangers, from a policy perspective, of holding 
that an autopsy report is a testimonial statement.150 In other 
words, value-to-the-defendant analysis is a factor in a judicial 
balancing test, which the Supreme Court overruled in Craw-
ford.151 Even if not used as part of a Roberts-type balancing 
test, judicial inquiry into the usefulness of potential cross-
examination is inapposite.152 Cross-examination is a “strategic 
decision” that the defendant may choose to exercise where she 
believes it will be useful or valuable153—such as where there is 
reason to suspect there were problems with the testing.154 
5. The Competing Interests of Society 
Courts worry that applying broadly the right to cross-
examination will hamper the efficient and effective administra-
tion of justice. The Supreme Court of Kansas expressed its fear 
that requiring the in-court testimony of a medical examiner 
who performed the autopsy relevant to a murder prosecution 
would waste public resources and, as in the case before it, prec-
lude prosecutorially valuable evidence—or even prosecution it-
self—where the medical examiner had died or otherwise be-
come unavailable.155 The court considered this to be a “harsh 
and unnecessary result,” since autopsy reports are generally re-
 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004). 
 152. Cf. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“A defendant’s right to confront witnesses against 
him does not depend on whether a court believes that cross-examination would 
be useful.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Cf. Metzger, supra note 1, at 499 (describing a case in which a state 
crime laboratory worker “engage[d] in long-term, systematic, and deliberate 
falsification of evidence in criminal cases”). 
 155. State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317, 322 (Kan. 2006). 
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liable and probably not fabricated.156 Other courts have voiced 
similar concerns.157 
Practical consequences to the public, however, are no long-
er a legitimate judicial consideration in deciding Confrontation 
Clause cases.158 The Court’s emphatic, uncompromising lan-
guage in Crawford makes clear that the Clause conveys upon 
the defendant an absolute right and that the determination of 
whether a statement is testimonial cannot be driven by policy 
considerations.159 
D. MACHINE WITNESSES: A DEVELOPING TWIST 
A new Confrontation Clause rule is developing in some of 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Already the Fourth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits have held lab reports to be nontestimonial 
statements of machines or computers. This section examines 
this theory, ultimately rejecting it as inconsistent with Su-
preme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
In August 2007 a divided panel for the Fourth Circuit is-
sued an opinion deciding United States v. Washington,160 a rou-
tine drunk driving case, on both typical and unique grounds. 
The court issued three alternative holdings to dispense of the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim: (1) the “raw data” that 
the expert witness relied upon or introduced were not state-
ments of the laboratory technicians; (2) the data were not hear-
say; and (3) the data were nontestimonial.161 All three holdings 
rely on the court’s conclusion that the reports were solely com-
puter-generated statements, which is an analytical angle from 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (not-
ing that an “‘autopsy cannot be replicated by another pathologist’” and indicat-
ing that it would be “‘against society’s interests to permit the unavailability of 
the medical examiner . . . to preclude the prosecution of a homicide case’” 
(quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005))); People 
v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 136–37 (Cal. 2007) (quoting with approval the factors 
that the Kansas Supreme Court assigned to society’s competing interests in 
the balancing test performed in Lackey). 
 158. Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (articulating a ba-
lancing test that would allow for competing interests such as “effective law en-
forcement” to outweigh the defendant’s right to confront witnesses at trial), 
with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (overruling Roberts 
and rejecting the use of a balancing test in place of the “constitutional guaran-
tee[ ]” of the Confrontation Clause). 
 159. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 passim. 
 160. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 161. Id. at 227–32. 
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which no other court had approached a Crawford issue pertain-
ing to forensic science. 
The relevant facts follow: Dwonne A. Washington was con-
victed of driving under the influence after testing positive for 
both phencyclidine (PCP) and alcohol above the legal limit.162 
The forensic laboratory’s machines produced data indicating 
the amount of these substances in Washington’s blood.163 The 
laboratory’s manager, who did not operate the machines, testi-
fied at trial as an expert witness to the test results and the im-
plications for Washington’s driving.164 In Washington’s view, he 
was entitled to confront the lab technicians who actually saw 
his blood and placed it in the testing machines.165 The magi-
strate judge overruled Washington’s objections and admitted 
the lab manager’s testimony.166 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned first that the data generated 
by the laboratory’s machines were based on the machines’, ra-
ther than the technicians’, viewing and analysis of Washing-
ton’s blood sample.167 “The raw data generated by the diagnos-
tic machines are the ‘statements’ of the machines themselves, 
not their operators.”168 Second, because Rule 801 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as a “statement,” which “is 
(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person,”169 the court reasoned that there was no hearsay—
computers are not persons.170 Third, “the reports generated by 
the machines were not testimonial in that they were not relat-
ing past events but the current condition of the blood in the 
machines.”171 Since the machine had no way of knowing that 
the blood sample it was analyzing was going to be used for evi-
dence at trial, the evidence could not be considered testimonial 
under the Davis purpose test.172 The court also noted that the 
possibility of cross-examining the technicians was of “no value” 
to the defendant, since the statements indicating that the blood 
 
 162. Id. at 227–28. 
 163. Id. at 228. 
 164. Id. at 228–29. 
 165. Id. at 229. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 230. 
 168. Id.  
 169. FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c) (emphasis added). 
 170. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231. 
 171. Id. at 232. 
 172. Id.  
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tested positive for alcohol and PCP were statements of the ma-
chines, not of the technicians.173 
In January 2008 Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing for a 
unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Moon, cited with approval the Fourth Circuit’s Washington de-
cision.174 In the Seventh Circuit, “raw data produced by scien-
tific instruments” are now nontestimonial, “though the inter-
pretation of those data may be testimonial.”175 The underlying 
reasoning is much the same: “If the readings are ‘statements’ 
by a ‘witness against’ the defendants, then the machine must 
be the declarant. Yet how could one cross-examine a gas chro-
matograph? Producing spectrographs, ovens, and centrifuges in 
court would serve no one’s interests.”176 
The logic of Moon is self-defeating. The Seventh Circuit 
conceded that “[a] chemist’s assertion that ‘this substance was 
cocaine’” is testimonial within the meaning of Davis.177 In 
drawing its data-interpretation distinction, the court explained 
by way of analogy that if a physician tests a patient’s blood, the 
conclusion that the patient has diabetes would be testimonial, 
but her insulin and blood sugar levels would be nontestimonial 
“raw results.”178 But in this example, the amount of insulin in 
the patient’s blood would be analogous to the amount of cocaine 
in the defendant’s blood; the conclusion that the patient has di-
abetes is closer to the conclusion that the defendant violated 
the law. The underlying chemical composition of cocaine, which 
the Seventh Circuit considers to be nontestimonial, is insepar-
able from the fact that the underlying chemical composition of 
cocaine is in fact simultaneously cocaine itself, which the Se-
venth Circuit considers to be testimonial. 
In part, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Washington is 
merely another example of the Roberts-type analysis. That Rule 
801 defines hearsay as a statement of a person (and not of a 
machine)179 is be irrelevant for constitutional purposes—
because “hearsay” for Confrontation Clause purposes is not 
necessarily identical to “hearsay” as defined by subject-to-
 
 173. Id. at 230. 
 174. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. See id. 
 179. FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c). 
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change evidence rules.180 Instead, the relevant question should 
be whether the statement is offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.181 The Fourth Circuit’s theory that the tests 
were a mere contemporaneous recordation of the state of the 
suspect’s blood is based on the misreading of Davis explained 
above.182 And the court’s reliance on the idea that the defen-
dant would not have gleaned anything of value from an oppor-
tunity for cross-examination is completely out of line with cur-
rent Confrontation Clause doctrine.183 
The Fourth Circuit’s twist on the problem—categorizing 
the laboratory reports as statements of the machines only—
functions as an attempt to cheat Crawford and Davis.184 Most 
importantly, this classification is conceptually bizarre. As the 
dissent explained, “[t]he test results, although computer-
generated, were produced with the assistance and input of the 
technicians and must therefore be attributed to the techni-
cians.”185 Traditionally, only if “the assertion is produced with-
out any human assistance or input” have federal courts consi-
dered computer-generated assertions not to be statements of 
persons.186 Here, the technician played a “significant role” in 
running the tests and creating and documenting the results.187 
One implication of the Washington majority’s classification 
is that the defendant has no right to confront the laboratory 
technician—there is no statement of the technician to cross-
examine.188 Because the court found that the report was not 
testimonial hearsay, it did not address the question of how the 
accused might enforce his right to confront a machine. Technol-
 
 180. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 181. Cf. id. at 59 n.9. 
 182. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827–28 (2006) (discussing con-
temporaneousness as only one of many factors to be considered in determining 
whether evidence is testimonial). 
 183. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–69 (rejecting the Roberts balancing test 
in favor of a bright line approach to Confrontation Clause analysis). 
 184. This approach has also gained traction in the Eleventh Circuit. See 
United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In light of the 
constitutional text and the historical focus of the Confrontation Clause, we are 
persuaded that the witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is con-
cerned are human witnesses, and that the evidence challenged in this appeal 
does not contain the statements of human witnesses.” (citing United States v. 
Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Washington, 498 
F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007))). 
 185. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231–32 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 233 (emphasis added). 
 187. Id.  
 188. See id. at 230 (majority opinion). 
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ogy is not yet at the point where a computer is capable of tak-
ing the stand and answering questions in response to counsel’s 
cross-examination. Yet while Crawford and Davis would accor-
dingly render the machine’s statement inadmissible, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that “reliability concerns” could be 
addressed “through authentication” of the underlying technolo-
gical processes, thereby suggesting that machine-generated tes-
timonial hearsay statements are admissible even though the 
witness is not subject to cross-examination.189 
Ultimately, machine-generated laboratory reports are pro-
duced jointly by machines and the persons operating the ma-
chines. The reports must be considered statements of those 
persons. Although the analysis in this section indicates that the 
laboratory reports at issue in Washington and Moon should 
have been held to be testimonial, more important is the under-
standing that such reports must be deemed either testimonial 
or nontestimonial on the same grounds as any other laboratory 
report. The machine-generated-statement theory is not persua-
sive. 
III.  AN ANALYSIS FOR COURTS TO FOLLOW   
In light of the split among lower courts, this Note proposes 
that courts should, in order to apply Crawford and Davis faith-
fully, start analyzing Confrontation Clause cases pertaining to 
scientific evidence in a consistent manner, set forth below. Two 
generalized groups of cases need to be treated differently. For 
dealing with laboratory reports, in most instances a bright-line 
rule declaring the reports testimonial statements of the persons 
who generated them will be appropriate. Autopsy reports 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis, while adhering to 
the principles outlined below. 
A. LABORATORY REPORTS: A (NEARLY) BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
Most laboratory reports used by prosecutors against the 
accused are prepared for criminal prosecution. Frequently oc-
curring examples include blood tests of persons suspected of 
driving while intoxicated and chemical analyses of seized sub-
stances suspected of being illegal narcotics. In such cases, 
courts should hold that the reports are per se testimonial. 
However, there will be rare cases in which such a ruling is in-
 
 189. See id. at 231. The court’s consideration of reliability is, of course, 
misplaced. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–69 (2004). 
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appropriate—this “Magyari exception” should be approached in 
an ad hoc manner. 
1. Many Laboratory Reports Are Testimonial Per Se 
Caulfield is, in all relevant factual aspects, typical of drug 
seizure cases. Police observed Scott Caulfield behaving suspi-
ciously in and outside of a bar in Rochester, Minnesota.190 In 
short, he was behaving like a drug dealer.191 The police lawful-
ly192 took six plastic bags from Caulfield, which contained what 
the suspect identified as cocaine.193 The police recorded a posi-
tive field test and sent the drugs to a crime laboratory, where 
an analyst produced a report identifying the substance as co-
caine.194 The prosecution introduced the analyst’s report with-
out putting the analyst on the stand.195 
For Confrontation Clause purposes, the facts of Kent are 
analogous to those of Caulfield. Late at night, Adam J. Kent 
crashed his car; he hit the curb and his car wound up upside-
down on somebody’s front yard.196 A police officer arrived and 
noticed that Kent smelled like alcohol.197 Kent’s speech was 
slurred and, when questioned, he admitted that he had con-
sumed five beers that evening.198 The officer concluded that 
Kent was intoxicated and arrested him, taking him to the hos-
pital because of the crash.199 At the request of the police, a hos-
pital worker drew a sample of Kent’s blood and signed a certifi-
cate indicating that he had followed protocol.200 The police sent 
the blood sample to their forensic laboratory, which issued a 
report concluding that Kent’s blood alcohol content was above 
the legal limit.201 
State v. Crager202 was a murder case in which the DNA 
analysis conducted also fits the pattern of Caulfield and 
 
 190. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Minn. 2006) (en banc). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Had the police behaved unlawfully, that would be a Fourth Amend-
ment question outside of the scope of this Note. 
 193. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 307. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. at 306. 
 196. State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 628 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 197. Id. at 629. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 629–30. 
 201. Id. at 630–31. 
 202. State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St.3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745.  
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Kent.203 The police found a woman lying murdered in the bed-
room of her home.204 They identified Lee Crager as a suspect, 
and upon finding his clothes covered in blood, submitted it for 
DNA testing; it was a match for the victim’s DNA.205 Crager’s 
DNA also matched that found on cigarettes at the crime 
scene.206 The prosecution offered the DNA report into evidence 
without having the DNA analyst who performed the tests testi-
fy at trial.207 
In each case—Caulfield, Kent, and Crager—the police sus-
pected the defendant of having committed a crime, and in order 
to prove that crime, had scientific tests run at a laboratory. In 
each case, a court can determine under a straightforward Davis 
analysis that the laboratory report is a testimonial statement of 
the person who authored it. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, 
to imagine any circumstances under which these tests would 
have been run in which law enforcement was not attempting to 
establish the facts relevant to the potential prosecution of a 
crime. It is similarly difficult or impossible to imagine any cir-
cumstances under which ordering a laboratory analysis of a 
seized substance believed to be illegal narcotics, a blood screen-
ing of a suspected drunk driver, or a DNA or other analysis 
matching a suspected criminal to evidence found at a crime 
scene, could possibly be for the purpose of enabling the police to 
meet an ongoing emergency. 
In short, where the police request a laboratory analysis of 
what seems to be evidence, that analysis will always be testi-
monial. In order to promote adherence to the Supreme Court’s 
presentation of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford and Da-
vis, courts should therefore articulate a bright-line rule an-
nouncing that such evidence is per se testimonial. 
 
 203. Courts in Kent and Caulfield and the appellate court in State v. Crag-
er, 164 Ohio App. 3d 816, 2005-Ohio-6868, 844 N.E.2d 390, found that labora-
tory reports are testimonial under Crawford. The Supreme Court of Ohio, 
however, reversed the appellate court’s decision in Crager, finding that under 
Crawford, the reports were “non-testimonial.” See 116 Ohio St.3d 369, 2007-
Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, at ¶ 78. 
 204. 116 Ohio St.3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, at ¶ 2. 
 205. Id. ¶ 2–4. 
 206. Id. ¶ 4. 
 207. Id. ¶ 8 (the DNA analyst who prepared the two DNA reports was on 
maternity leave at the time of trial). 
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2. The Magyari Exception 
In Magyari, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces en-
countered the issue of an employer’s regularly conducted, ran-
domized urine testing which had the potential to trigger crimi-
nal prosecution.208 The laboratory technicians had no way of 
knowing whose sample they were working with; it was identical 
to the other 199 samples in the batch.209 A civilian analogue to 
the facts of Magyari may not even presently exist.210 
The facts of this case are extremely important, and a totali-
ty of the circumstances test was appropriately applied. The 
technicians knew or should have known that a positive test 
could trigger prosecution. The tests were serving a law en-
forcement function.211 But no person whose sample was tested 
should be considered a suspect, and in the case of each sample, 
it was far more likely than not that no crime had been commit-
ted.212 When sufficiently similar cases arise, courts ought to 
look at the facts of each case, apply the rules articulated in 
Crawford and Davis where possible, and consider the aims of 
the Confrontation Clause and the spirit in which the two cases 
were decided. Courts should keep in mind that the Sixth 
Amendment expresses a preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion at trial. In asking whether the circumstances surrounding 
the request for the scientific analysis indicate that the purpose 
is to prove facts potentially relevant to a subsequent prosecu-
tion, the particularity of the request is relevant—the existence 
of a suspect or criminal investigation makes it more likely that 
the scientific analysis will be testimonial. And civilian law en-
forcement should be given less leeway than the military be-
cause the military deals only with the members of its own or-
 
 208. See United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123, 127 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (apply-
ing the Confrontation Clause analysis framework of Crawford and Roberts, 
civilian criminal proceedings, to court-martial proceedings). 
 209. Id. at 126. 
 210. The closest analogous situation might be employer drug testing. A 
nonmilitary employer’s sanctions for a failed drug test, however, do not in-
clude criminal or equivalent proceedings. Absent an employer working in co-
operation with law enforcement, there is not even the potential for criminal 
proceedings—an obvious requirement for application of the Confrontation 
Clause. 
 211. But see Magyari, 63 M.J. at 126 (“In this context, the better view is 
that these lab technicians were not engaged in a law enforcement function, a 
search for evidence in anticipation of prosecution or trial.”). 
 212. See id. 
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ganization, in what the Supreme Court has long recognized as 
“the unique nature of . . . the military society.”213 
B. AUTOPSY REPORTS 
An autopsy report is not “prepared for use at trial,” but 
“any medical examiner preparing such a report must expect 
that it may later be available for use at trial.”214 An autopsy re-
port records the medical examiner’s observations and an-
nounces a cause of death.215 Rather than being prepared at the 
request of law enforcement officers, it is frequently ordered by 
statute and performed by a nonadversarial medical examin-
er.216 However, the fact that the medical examiner is not sup-
posed to be in an adversarial relationship with the suspect is 
not a valid constitutional consideration.217 
Courts will have to weigh the relevant constitutional con-
siderations under the surrounding circumstances of each case. 
To what extent does using an autopsy report as evidence 
against a criminal defendant resemble the use of ex parte evi-
dence against the accused? How much potential is there for 
prosecutorial abuse, especially in highly political cases? To 
what extent should the medical examiner anticipate that the 
autopsy will prove past events relevant to use at a criminal tri-
al? 
On a general level, one commentator has suggested that 
“the Confrontation Clause should allow a defendant to confront 
the crucial piece of hearsay that directly establishes an element 
of the crime.”218 More particularly, it is clear that an autopsy 
report is at least functionally equivalent to one type of forma-
lized statement—an affidavit—about which the Court ex-
pressed concern.219 Whether the police have identified a suspect 
 
 213. See United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 555 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 
2006) (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)). 
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should be a significant factor in a court’s decision. If there is a 
suspect, there is an ongoing criminal investigation and a medi-
cal examiner has a reason to reach a certain result. At the mo-
ment it becomes clear that foul play was likely involved in the 
subject’s death, whether because there is an ongoing criminal 
investigation or because the body itself so indicates, an objec-
tive observer would think that the report is reasonably likely to 
be used at trial.220 While these factors indicate that there is a 
good chance an autopsy report used by the prosecution in a 
criminal trial will be testimonial, there are imaginable circums-
tances in which it will be nontestimonial—such as where there 
are no identified suspects and there is low potential for 
abuse.221 
  CONCLUSION   
Due to a sharp split among the lower courts in the wake of 
Crawford and Davis, criminal defendants in a significant num-
ber of jurisdictions are being denied their constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against them. In cases involving forensic 
science, many courts are applying federal constitutional law 
correctly. Many others, however, are still analyzing the evi-
dence under a now-defunct Roberts test and reaching the wrong 
result, thereby preventing a large number of defendants from 
cross-examining the forensic scientists who function as power-
ful witnesses against them. Courts should announce that where 
the police request a forensic laboratory analysis of what seems 
to be evidence, that analysis is a per se testimonial statement 
of the person who played a significant role in conducting the 
scientific testing. Courts should undertake fact-intensive case-
 
finitions of “testimonial,” one of which deals with formalized statements such 
as affidavits). 
 220. The “what an objective person would reasonably think” standard has 
been used frequently in constitutional law, particularly in constitutional crim-
inal procedure. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral 
and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of 
“Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 713–19 (2008). With re-
spect to the Confrontation Clause, the text of the Court’s jurisprudence creates 
the foundation for such a test. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (discussing the 
“objective witness” formulation of a “testimonial” statement). 
 221. Somewhat paradoxically, there might be as much potential for prose-
cutorial abuse where the circumstances indicate that foul play might—but 
might not—have been involved, because in this situation the medical examin-
er’s statement has the ability to propel or stall prosecution of any eventual 
suspect. This further supports the idea that autopsy reports will require fact-
intensive analysis under the Confrontation Clause. 
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by-case analyses where autopsy reports are at issue, applying a 
totality of the circumstances test in which the identification of 
a suspect in a criminal investigation is an especially weighty 
factor. 
